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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943 ABSTRACT
A logistic function was used to generate probabilities
of reenlistment among sailors who were assigned to 17 San
Diego based fast frigates from FY77 through FY83. These
probabilities were compared to reenlistment behavior and the
means of their residuals plotted on time lines. The graphs
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INTRODUCTION
Men mean more than guns in the rating of a ship.
John Paul Jones
The importance of the enlisted man has been a tenet
throughout the history of the U.S. Navy. From John Paul
Jones to the current CNO , "people programs" have rated top
priority and commanding officers have been held responsible
to "take care of your men." 1 The degree to which this dictum
is heeded varies throughout the fleet from one skipper to
the next, but as Rear Admiral Hauley F. Cope, author of
Command at Sea
,
chided, "Woe betide the young captain that
fails to appreciate this" [Ref. 1]
.
The relationship between the commanding officer of a
naval vessel and his crew is a special one. Operating in a
constantly hostile environment, the crew is heavily depen-
dent upon the abilities and resourcefulness of the indi-
vidual in command- -the skipper. Through the ages, this
relationship has been chronicled by numerous authors. Sea
captains have been described as everything from benevolent
masters to murderous tyrants.
That this relationship merits close scrutiny is obvious
when the small ship is considered:
1) The small ship navy constitutes a "society" character-
ized by crowded living conditions, rigorous working environ-
ment, and an emphasis on team work [Ref. 2],
: U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen are required to be
familiar
u
with Captain Thomas Truxton's advice to his offi-
cers. "Care for your men; see that each understands his
duties; exact instant obedience; superintend everything;
practice daily with the guns." Captain Truxton, a scholar
as well as seaman, was a strict disciplinarian as Commanding




and 2) the commanding officer's criticality to the effec-
tiveness of the military organization is magnified by the
small confines [Ref . 1] . It is not uncommon for a
commanding officer to have daily contact, whether personal
or through written directives, with nearly every sailor
aboard his ship. Each man on that ship is continually aware
of the commanding officer's authority and importance.
Given the amount of influence and authority that a
commanding officer has on his ship, he is held accountable
by the Navy for the various observable behaviors demon-
strated by the ship ranging from combat readiness to crew
morale. Perhaps the most visible effect of his influence is
the reenlistment rate of crew members.
A. REENLISTMENT
Reenlistment is the process by which an enlisted member
of the Military Services signs a contract obligating his
services to the military beyond his current obligated
service date. First-term reenlistment s are normally consid-
ered as reenlistment s of personnel who are completing their
first terms of enlistment. Career reenlistments are for
those personnel accepting a second and subsequent
reenlistment [Ref. 3].
Reenlistment data are commonly measured as percentages
.
They are computed by dividing the number of personnel that
reenlist in the various categories by the number that are
eligible to reenlist in those categories.
B. REENLISTMENT RATE CONCERNS
Although the Military Services have experienced a trend
of increasing reenlistment percentages during the past four
years , the trend is by no means guaranteed for the future
[Ref. 3]. Studies have linked recruiting and retention to
11
the unemployment conditions in the civilian sector; there-
fore, an improving national economic climate would have
negative effects on the Military Services. If the national
economy improves and retention declines, reenlistment rates
will again move to the front of the crisis queue for the
Military Services, as all parties- -Military Services,
Department of Defense, President, and Congress- - search for a
panacea.
The problems caused by low reenlistment rates have been
set forth by all levels of the military, government, and
academic communities. All agree that low reenlistment rates
lead to declines in military readiness. Because of the
increasing sophistication of weapons systems that are
provided to our armed forces , it is critical that the people
operating these systems possess high levels of training and
experience in order to maximize weapon system effectiveness.
When personnel leave the services after initial tours of
duty, they drain the services of the training and experience
gained over the period of the enlistment. Newly recruited
talent must fill this void, but not without an initial
degradation in systems effectiveness. To place this loss-
and-refill scenario in proper perspective, it has been esti-
mated that the Navy must recruit a minimum of six personnel
to create one First Class Petty Officer with 8.5 years of
service [Ref . 4]
.
Perhaps more visible is the fiscal strain placed on the
Defense Department by a transient enlisted force. Not only
are weapons systems under-utilized, the price tag to train
replacement personnel is enormous. The Navy must spend
$13,000 to replace a Boiler Technician Petty Officer Third
Class (BT3) with one year of service and $53,000 to replace
a BT3 with four years of service [Ref. 5]. Price tags of
this magnitude, multiplied by 100,000 Navy accessions per




More disconcerting is the fact that low retention is a
part of a debilitating downward spiral. As retention rates
drop, those personnel that remain in the service are
required to shoulder an inordinate work load. Longer hours
and less experienced leadership lead to ever-deteriorating
working conditions resulting in even lower reenlistment
rates
.
When placed against the backdrop of a decreasing
manpower pool available to the Military Services through
1992, the analysis of the retention problem and formulation
of solutions becomes even more critical [Ref. 6]. To effec-
tively man the armed forces of the immediate future, a
concerted effort must be brought to bear. The individual's
reenlistment decision process must be fully studied. The
factors which promote increased retention and those which
stimulate the exodus must be identified. Not until these
factors are identified can administrative and monetary
policy adjusted to promote higher reenlistment rates.
C. PURPOSE
This thesis examines some of the links between a
commanding officer and his crew through analysis of the
degree to which a commanding officer influences the reen-
listment rate aboard his ship. The thesis presents a unique
approach to the measurement of this relationship.
A turnover model will be presented along with a discus-
sion of reenlistment research concentrating on those vari-
ables that were determined to be significant in previous
research efforts. A methodology will then be developed that
combines these variables and tests the model. Analyses will
be performed to compare the proposed model with raw reen-
listment percentages. Finally, results will be discussed
emphasising the contribution of this approach to an under-




In their investigation of turnover, researchers have
attempted to determine why employees choose voluntarily to
leave organizations. Although, the general concepts of job
satisfaction, organizational environment, organizational
commitment, and other more specific concepts, such as pay
and working conditions, have been defined and investigated,
the relationships remain speculative. Consequently, the
results of studies are often inconclusive, and little is
understood concerning the extent to which antecedents actu-
ally impinge on an individual's behavior within the organi-
zation [Ref. 7]. The discussion offered here will focus
upon those factors which were found to be at the heart of
the turnover issue. For reasons which will be explained
later, these factors will be translated into a shipboard
context
.
B. ANTECEDENTS OF TURNOVER
A model is offered in Figure 2.1 which depicts the
antecedents of turnover. "Significant others" are repre-
sented in this schematic because of their presence in turn-
over research results; yet, the discussion here will
emphasize only the critical path.
This model does not diverge significantly from the
unified model proposed by Bluedorn in 1982 [Ref. 8]. (See
Figure 2.2.) Bluedorn's goal was to develop a unified model
to "achieve cumulative progress between" four previous
research traditions in the area of turnover research. He
succeeded in producing a synthesis of those works. His
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The relationship of organizational commitment to
turnover is well established. The consensus, best expressed
by Porter and Dubin [Ref. 9] is that "commitment to the
organization is an attitude that is related to decisions of
the individual to stay with an organization." The causes of
the commitment - turnover relationship are less well defined,
but "may be associated with such positive outcomes for indi-
vidual employees as enhanced feelings of belonging,
security, efficiency, goals and purpose in life, and posi-
tive self-image" [Ref. 10].
Other significant contributors to turnover behavior
have been examined. Opportunity for alternate employment
has been shown by several empirical studies to have an
effect on turnover, and by other empirical studies to have
little or no effect [Ref. 8] [Ref. 11]. Despite the contra-
dictory findings, organizational commitment is considered
the most consistent antecedent- - the principal point being
"declining commitment leads to turnover." [Ref. 10]
2
.
Satisfaction With Military Life
The second concept in the critical path model,
depicted in Figure 2.1, is job satisfaction which has been
defined as the sum total of an individual's met or unmet
expectations on the job [Ref. 12]. However, in this model,
where reenlistment is the behavior being considered, "job
satisfaction" is expanded to "satisfaction with military
life," defined as the sum total of an individual's met or
unmet expectations of the entire service experience.
Justification for this expansion lies in the assertion by
Steers [Ref. 13] that the influences on commitment are
grouped into the categories of personal, job, and
organizational characteristics. Therefore, these
17
characteristics are better represented by the global term
"satisfaction with military life," particularly when stud-
ying an institution such as the military.
3 . Organizational Environment
The third link in the model, the antecedents of
satisfaction with military life, like the commitment antece-
dents, are modified by personal, job, and organizational
characteristics. The primary difference between the two,
satisfaction with military life and organizational commit-
ment, is that satisfaction is less stable than commitment
over time [Ref. 13]. Therefore, satisfaction with military
life is influenced more by conditions that are close at hand
and part of daily life such as those influences provided by
the immediate organizational environment.
The most immediate environment includes the employ-
ees' perceptions of the organizational environment created
by the policies of an organization's leaders and supervi-
sors, whether on a local unit level or on an organization-
wide level. These policies, from personal grooming
standards to fiscal expenditures to living conditions,
influence every aspect of the work and organizational envi-
ronment. Schneider [Ref. 14] addressed this man-
organization relationship when he noted that people behave
and react in ways that fit their conceptions of the
prevailing climate they perceive. Organizations, by their
policies, structure, resources, and managerial personnel,
can influence employees' attitudes.
Empirical evidence of the relationship between
organizational environment and satisfaction with military
life was provided by preliminary thesis research by this
author utilizing the 1978 POD Survey of Officers and
Enlisted Personnel [Ref. 15] conducted by The Rand
18
Corporation. 2 Using a sample of first term Navy enlisted
personnel serving aboard ship, the primary significant
contributors to satisfaction with military life were found
to be
:
1. perception of unit morale,
2. satisfaction with current duty station, and
3. the respondent's opinion of the command's vital
equipment capabilities.
These findings indicate, in the man-organization
system, perceptions of satisfaction with military life are
determined by factors present in the immediate environment
rather than by factors attributed to the more removed organ-
ization. That is, morale and conditions aboard ship have a
greater impact in the individual's perceptions than do pay
and personnel policies of the Naval organization.
4. Commanding Officer as Antecedent
The final antecedent in the critical path model, and
the central theme of this thesis, is the commanding officer
of the ship. His impact on the organizational environment
was recently developed by the research efforts of Gullickson
and Chenette [Ref. 16]. After a considerable number of
interviews with shipboard personnel, from squadron
commanders to deck seamen, they concluded that the excel-
lence observed on the ships that were studied was the
"result of the leadership of the commanding officers of
these ships." Their interviews invariably arrived at the
conclusion that the skipper of the ship set the tone for the
entire command. His professional knowledge, and leadership
2 This survey was commissioned by the Department of
Defense to provide a data base to be used in addressing
manpower problems. It included four versions and was admin-
istered to approximately 93,000 men and women in all four
Military Services.
19
was the catalyst. The skipper, more than any other factor,
determined the organizational environment.
C. EMPLOYEE -ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (EOE)
Considering the potential for countless interrelation-
ships among the organizational environment, satisfaction,
and commitment concepts, it is not inconsistent with the
critical path model to consider these three as components of
an all-inclusive concept, to be referred to as the
Employee-Organization Environment (EOE). In this way,
regardless of individual, job, or organization specific
characteristics, the three antecedents of turnover (organi-
zational commitment, satisfaction with military life, organ-
izational environment) may be treated as a system. This
permits investigation of the effects of the commanding
officer on the system without having to account for the
myriad of potential interrelationships within the system.
The abridged model looks like Figure 2.3.
D. REENLISTMENT RESEARCH
Although much research has been devoted to studying
turnover in civilian organizations, the literature prepared
for the military provides more insight into the reenlistment
problem. The military environment presents ambient influ-
ences which can significantly alter a person's perceptions.
As a result, many of the factors that must be considered
when studying reenlistment behavior are unique to that envi-
ronment. Factors which are of significance for reenlistment
are not necessariy the most important factors considered in
studies of civilian turnover. To explicate this point, it
must be emphasized that the military is an institution
rather than an organization. A vivid example is that a




























































































































Figure 2.3 Consolidated Turnover Model
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in the Navy" [Ref. 17]. Many concepts such as personal
sacrifice, considered a way of life in the military, are
viewed differently by the civilian community. Finally,
these influences are most pervasive in the life of a Navy
enlisted man at sea because of the requirements of life and
work in a unique and restricted environment [Ref. 18].
E. CATEGORIES
Although retention research is a complex discipline, it
may be regarded as having two main categories: 1) research
exploring the effects of econometric variables, and 2)
research exploring organization and personal variables. The
first category supplies answers to the question, How and
where should money be injected into the compensation system
in order to increase retention? This research benefits high
level policy makers. The second category attempts to iden-
tify the right organization- personnel chemistry, and
explores the organizational environment's effect on an indi-
vidual's perceptions and attitudes without specific atten-
tion to compensation [Ref. 19]. Its research findings are
more applicable to the operational level, the level at which
the man-organization interface exists. Although researchers
may set out to examine the two categories separately, the
interrelationships of pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors
often cause them to conclude that the effects of one group




Econometric analysis has proven to be the more quantifi-
able of the two categories. Research in this area has dealt
with positive and negative effects on retention attributed







Figure 2.4 Initial Reenlistment Behavior Model.
fringe benefits, and other allowances. This research was
slow to gain acceptance from military and government offi-
cials because they contended that serving in the military is
a duty, and economic principles of supply and demand do not
apply. The advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1972,
however, changed the complexion of the problem. After 1972,
policy makers began to accept the principle that economic
considerations in military career choice are not
unpatriotic
.
1 . Early Studies
The first economic studies were conducted in the
1960's during the Vietnam War when the Military Services
23
were seeking to attract and retain quality personnel during
a period of increasing hostility toward military service.
Quigley and Wilburn in 1969 [Ref. 20] studied the reenlist-
ment decision based on behavior as a function of dollar pay,
marital status, paygrade, proficiency pay, high school grad-
uate, race, age at decision point, aptitude, years of
schooling, average civilian earnings opportunities at deci-
sion, and Air Force Specialty Code. Significant positive
predictors in the general equation were dollar pay, age, and
race. Significant negative predictors were proficiency pay,
years of education, and civilian earnings. As much as 83.5
percent of the variance was accounted for by their models
using these variables [Ref. 21]. Previous researchers had
shown somewhat less significant results.
Several research efforts in the 1970 's and 1980 's
have subsequently used a purely economic approach. Bradley
in 1980 [Ref. 4] developed a statistical model to explain
past Navy career retention rates and to predict future
career retention rates in the Navy. His model utilized
econometric variables as predictors. Bradley felt that
"modern military man is very much aware of the economic
aspects of his employment and bases his decision whether to
remain in the service in large measure on those economic
factors" [Ref. 4], He concluded that three variables are
significant predictors of careerist reenlistment rates:
1. career Regular Military Compensation (RMC), which is
the total value of compensation (ignoring tax advan-
tage and retirement accrual) received by the
serviceman,
2. unemployment rate, and
3. The Index of All Services Less Rent, which is taken
from the Economic Report of the President, 1980.
Bepko in 1981 [Ref. 22] determined that military
compensation, unemployment, and civilian wage opportunities
24






Reining in slightly on the econometricians , Hand,
Griffeth, and Mobley concluded in their 1977 critical review
of retention research that "research results to date indi-
cate that pay is a predictor of the specified criteria
(reenlistment intentions). However, the magnitude of the
variance accounted for is relatively small." [Ref. 21]
Another limitation of econometric analysis was iden-
tified by Gotz and McCall in 1980 [Ref. 23], who pointed out
that "most economic theories are designed with the indi-
vidual in mind, whereas only aggregate data are available."
The authors concluded that a life cycle model was required
to capture the effects of the future in present decision
making, and even when the models were constructed, the
available data was inappropriate. Their work with dynamic
models included a model for individuals who were making
sequential decisions in uncertain environments
.
3 Annualized Cost of Leaving
Regardless of the exact impact of pay variables that
were studied, the most substantial contribution of econo-
metric analysis to date has been the creation of the
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. This model, devel-
oped by the Center for Naval Analyses, projects the effects
of changes in military compensation on the size and composi-
tion of the Navy enlisted force. The model recognizes that
the reenlistment rate depends upon the differential between
military pay and the civilian pay that enlistees could earn
by leaving the military. The model computes the change in
this pay differential that results from a change in compen-
sation policy, and transforms it into a change in the
25
reenlistment rate and the resulting enlisted force profile
[Ref. 24].
A corollary to the ACOL model has been the estab-
lishment of the elasticity of reenlistment with respect to
pay. After examining numerous studies of first-term enlist-
ment, Enns in 1977 [Ref. 25] found that the distrubution of
results centered just above 2.0 and that virtually all the
estimated elasticities have been between 1.0 and 3.0 per
cent increase in reenlistments for each percent increase in
pay. [Ref. 26]
G. BEYOND ECONOMICS
The importance of the econometric studies and the impact
of economic factors on reenlistment rates goes unchallenged.
However, a look beyond economics is required if a better
understanding of the individual's reenlistment decision is
to be attained. The essence of this argument was poignantly
stated by the work of Fletcher and Geisler in 1981
[Ref. 27]. They found that first term reenlistees decisions
were significantly affected by pay factors, but career
personnel were influenced more by job and quality of life
factors
.
1 . Early Models
Various penetrations into the organization/person
labyrinth have been attempted. These range from studies of
the effects of single variables to more complex models. In
their critical review of literature previously cited, Hand,
Griffeth, and Mobley categorized studies under organization
practices, climate, job content, attitudes and satisfaction,
expectations, demographic and/or biographic, and aptitude
scores. After reviewing 67 separate studies in these
categories, the authors concluded that none of the variables
26
showed consistently significant predictive qualities. They
stated that reenlistment is clearly multi-variate and that
no single category outside of the economic category accounts
for a substantial amount of variance. The authors also
stated, "the need is to include the broadest possible spec-
trum of predictors to increase the amount of variance
accounted for." [Ref. 21]
2 . Recent Models
Since the 1977 effort of Hand, Mobley, and Griffeth,
virtually every aspect of the organization role and climate
has been studied. These environmental factors, unlike
econometric variables which are easily differentiated, are
diverse, interrelated, and, subsequently, hard to separate.
Therefore, development of a model that can articulate the
pure effects of individual variables is an arduous task. In
addition, "data are difficult, expensive, and time-consuming
to accumulate" [Ref. 3]. Nevertheless, research in this
area has produced models which contribute to predictive
capabilities
.
Using survivor data analysis, Thomason in 1979
[Ref. 28], examined assignment strategies to optimize
survival and found that they were in no conflict with those
strategies optimizing reenlistment. In regard to reenlist-
ments , he found that the probability of reenlistment varied
across ratings. In addition, non- Caucasians were more
likely to reenlist, those personnel with dependents were
more likely to reenlist, and certain types of duty was more
conducive to higher reenlistment rates.
Christensen in 1983 [Ref. 29] examined various pecu-
niary and nonpecuniary influences in the likelihood of reen-
listing and found that the respondent's perception of the
family being better off as a civilian was the most influen-
tial variable. Satisfaction with military life and special
pays also showed influence.
27
Lurie in 1981 [Ref. 30] found that education level,
age, and "A" school attendance were significant predictors
of survival in the Navy through eight years of service.
A sophisticated approach was provided by Nakada in
1984 [Ref. 31] when he used a discrete version of the
proportional hazards model of Cox [Ref. 32]. This is a
nonparametric method for estimating a survival curve while
controlling for factors that may affect survival. Race,
age, mental group, education level, number of dependents,
and amount of consecutive sea duty were included as vari-
ables. Mental group, education, dependents, and a variable
measuring the joint effects of sea duty and dependents
showed negative coefficients. The remainder were positive.
Farkas in 1981 [Ref. 33] used survey data to deter-
mine how unmet expectations, changes in satisfaction, and
changes in commitment relate to changes in the intention to
reenlist. He found that unmet expectations determine both
satisfaction and commitment, and commitment was more impor-
tant than satisfaction in determining reenlistment
intentions
.
Nice in 1981 [Ref. 34] narrowed his field of
research to the analysis of Navy family separations. He
wanted to determine the psychological effects of duty-
related separations on Navy wives, including their effects
upon retention intentions. By analysis of survey data, he
found the best predictors of a husband's reenlistment intent
to be
:
1. wife's attitude toward her husband's reenlistment,
2. husband's attitude toward the Navy, and
3. a high level of family stress perceived by the
husband
.
Farkas and Durning in 1983 [Ref. 35] examined the
characteristics and needs of Navy families and found that
the best predictors of reenlistment intention were general
28
satisfaction with life in the Navy, family pressure to leave
the Navy, and sex (females expressed less intention to reen-
list than males).
H. BALANCED MODELS
As they examined the effects of specific variables on
reenlistment intentions or behavior, researchers had little
difficulty obtaining significant results. However, the
proportion of variance in reenlistment accounted for by the
variables chosen for study varied from sample to sample and
data base to data base, depending upon the availability of
survey or archival data. Researchers in many of the more
comprehensive studies of reenlistment behavior sought to
balance the influences of pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors
by including a wide range of variables in their models.
Chow and Polich in 1980 [Ref. 19] may have developed the
most balanced research as they constructed a model of reen-
listment that integrated detailed measures of the economic
value of military compensation with a broad range of noneco-
nomic factors representing the experiences of enlisted
personnel. They explained, "generally, compensation factors
are viewed as policy tools that management can manipulate to
affect reenlistment s, whereas noneconomic variables are
viewed as 'limiting factors' that may make a particular
subgroup more difficult to retain."
Adams in 1981 [Ref. 5] also researched interrelation-
ships of numerous factors and was able to "reconfirm the
fact that perceptions concerning pay/ compensation, family
separation and job dissatisfaction are strongly related to
the decision to leave the Navy."
Sigerrud in 1981 [Ref. 36] concluded that the most
important retention intention factors were military pay and
civilian opportunities, duty station (sea duty or serving
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ashore) and family considerations. He also concluded that
the importance of these factors varied across ratings.
As mentioned earlier, Fletcher and Geisler [Ref. 27]
used Navy Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP) survey
data to examine attitudes toward Navy life. After analyzing
evaluations of pay, housing, training, supervision, and
other facets of Navy life, these authors concluded that
first termers showed that pay and satisfaction with the job
are consistently important factors in retention. However,
career personnel were found to be more responsive to mili-
tary life factors. The importance of these factors varied
slightly across ratings.
Marcus in 1984 [Ref. 26] found that "there is a signifi-
cant relationship between advancement and retention," and
recommended that advancement be used as an effective and
selective retention tool.
The work of Baughman and Darnell in 1982 [Ref. 37]
concluded that if organizational commitment is present, pay
inequity and job satisfaction do not contribute to career
intent. Organizational commitment, tenure, potential upward
mobility, sex, opportunity for a more enjoyable job, and age
group did contribute to career intent. Their examination of
the interrelationships between econometric and organiza-
tional variables led these authors to conclude that pay was
not a direct contributor to the retention decision.
I. VARIABLE CANDIDATES
The purpose of the foregoing literature review has not
been to argue the relative significance of the myriad of
variables discussed, but rather to point out the diversity























































Table 1 summarizes the variables which have proven
significant from time to time in reenlistment research. The




The proportion of variance in reenlistment intentions/
behavior accounted for by individual variables is small, and
in many multivariate models with pecuniary and nonpecuniary
variables entered, the proportion of variance in the reen-
listment decision that is explained by the best combination
of independent variables rarely exceeded 35 percent. This
means that more than half of the factors accounting for the
variance in the reenlistment decision remains at large. A
vivid example of this unexplained variance is the fluctua-
tion of reenlistment rates across fleet units. Although all
ships operate under the same pay scale and Navy-wide
personnel policies, reenlistment rates for any fiscal
quarter may vary by over 50 percent from one unit to the
next. Figure 2.5 emphasizes this point.
Figure 2.5 contains the average reenlistment rate for a
group of fast frigates homeported in San Diego, California
from 1977 to 1983. During each quarter, despite the aver-
ages
,
several ships obtained either percent or 100 percent
reenlistment. In order for researchers to better understand
the reenlistment decision, the objective of research must
shift to the reduction of unexplained variance. To
accomplish this objective, new approaches must be explored
that will incorporate facets of the reenlistment decision
that have yet to be examined.
One source of the variance may lie in the infinite
possibilities of interrelationships of the variables that
are studied by researchers. For instance, the effect of pay
on the reenlistment decision varies across mental groups,
age groups, family size, family background, ratings, etc.
In addition, environmental factors such as sea duty and
family separations have unique effects upon quality of life
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Figure 2.5 Fleet Reenlistment Rates
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endless; therefore, clearly established effects of indi-
vidual variables are difficult to determine.
A second source of unexplained variance may lie within
the area of intangible variables. To date these variables,
which encompass such unmeasureable concepts as pride in
serving one's country, job security, respect by the civilian
community, job satisfaction, observed leadership, team
unity, work supervision and others, have been dealt with in
Navy-wide surveys with the acknowledgement that their
particular effects upon an individual will vary with envi-
ronmental modifiers and with bio-demographic variables.
Consequently, these intangibles, measured separately, rarely
display significance for the prediction of reenlistment
.
Therefore, this thesis poses the following question: Might
not the influence of these intangibles vary from command to
command depending upon how that command (immediate organiza-
tion) nurtured and supported those intangibles?
The answer is plausibly, yes, because as Porter and
Dubin pointed out [Ref. 9] "the immediate unit in which
he/she is located represents a key part of the total organi-
zation climate- - indeed , for many the 'organization' is the
immediate unit." Because of its effect on climate, the
immediate command must have a major influence on the indi-
vidual's perceptions of the organizational environment.
A vivid example of the command influences on the indi-
vidual is demonstrated by the results of the Enlisted
Seperation Questionnaire 3 where six of the top ten dissatis-
fiers are consistently found to be:
1. too many petty regulations,
3 Since 1980, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
has requested personnel, officers and enlisted, who are
leaving the Navy to fill out this questionnaire. The
results are compiled by the Officer and Enlisted Retention
Section (OP-136D) and used as input to personnel policies.
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2. lack of recognition for doing a good job,
3. not being treated with respect,
4. too much unfair treatment,
5. not enough chance to do more interest ing/ challenging
work, and
6. senior officers don't care about enlisted people.
All six of these factors, it may be argued, are influenced
by the immediate command.
K. PROBLEM/HYPOTHESIS
The magnitude of the effect of the immediate command on
the individual's reenlistment decision is the central theme
of this thesis. It is hypothesized that certain influences
inherent in a command act to modify all or some of the
previously studied employee-organizational environment (EOE)
factors. It is further hypothesized that these command
influences are ultimately manifested in reenlistment rates.
Finally, it is hypothesized that although unit reenlist-
ment percentages are the most prevalent measure of a
command's retention success, these percentages do not always





Encouragement for new concepts and methodologies is
found in the remarks of contributing author Barry M. Staw in
the 1984 edition of the Annual Review of Psychology
[Ref. 38]. Staw states that turnover research "has been
fairly narrow conceptually" and that it had not gone beyond
commonsense theorizing. An attempt is offered here to break
out of the mold of regression research with a new approach.
Given the significant impact of the commanding officer
on the organizational environment as detailed earlier, the
approach begins with the assumption that changes in the
employee-organization environment (EOE) occur shortly after
changes of commanding officers. It is further assumed that
both the magnitude and the direction of changes in EOE are a
function of individual commanding officer leadership and
managerial abilities. After each new commanding officer
takes command of a ship, his influence on the organizational
environment gradually increases as his policies and leader-
ship are imposed. Subsequently, subordinates' perceptions
of the organization are influenced by the impact of the
commanding officer on the EOE. The result of this chain of
events and processes is seen in various observable behaviors
such as crew morale, ship combat readiness, and reenlistment
rates. Of these, reenlistment rate is the most quantifi-
able, and will serve as the ultimate criterion for verifica-
tion of the methodology.
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B. QUASI EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
An experimental design was required which would articu-
late the discrete effect of a change of commanding officer
on the EOE . Campbell and Stanley addressed similar circum-
stances in their development of experimental and quasi-
experimental designs for research [Ref. 39]. The classical
control group design calls for two randomly selected groups.
One group undergoes a treatment over a period of time while
the second group does not . At the end of the treatment
period, posttest results of both groups are compared with
pretest results of both groups. Analysis of the test
results is then made in order to determine the affect of the
treatment on the one group.
According to Campbell and Stanley, many factors can
jeopardize the internal and external validity of this simple
experimental design. For instance, the individual charac-
teristics of members of each group could affect the extent
to which the treatment was effective. Thus, internal
validity is jeopardized by differences across individuals.
In a related manner, influences, such as the environment,
may affect either the groups, or the effectiveness of the
treatment and thus jeopardize external validity.
C. PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The design proposed here attempts to control for these
jeopardizing factors. In experimental terms, the ship prior
to the arrival of a new commanding officer is the treatment
group. The reenlistment rate for that ship prior to the
arrival is the pretest score. After the new commanding
officer takes over and institutes his policies and leader-
ship, the treatment period begins. A treatment is defined
as the set of characteristics of a commanding officer which
produce changes in the EOE. Thus each commanding officer
37
represents a different treatment. As his tour onboard
progresses, reenlistment rates provide posttest results,
with the rates near the end of his tour being the best indi-
cator because of the increased amount of time for the
commanding officer to impact the EOE . An analysis of the
pretest results compared to the posttest results provides
the researcher with an overall view of the impact that each
skipper ultimately had on the ship.
D. METHODOLOGY BLUEPRINT
Formulation of the method to fit this experimental
design began with a general blueprint. As many variables as
possible whose values were available would be incorporated
into a model that would discriminate between two levels of a
dependent variable- -reenlist or not reenlist . This discrim-
ination would be translated into probabilities of reen-
listing, given the unique set of values of each individual
for the controlling factors , and then compared to actual
behavior. These comparisons would then be studied over the
tenure of a commanding officer.
E. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY
Internal validity is protected by the randomized assign-
ment of crew members to the various ships and the use of the
logistic function which establishes each individual's prob-
ability of reenlistment.
External validity was protected through a method of
analysis by cohort. A cohort is defined by the personnel
making the reenlistment choice during each fiscal year.
This method all but eliminates the external influences of
national economic conditions, civilian unemployment, and
current prestige of the military because all personnel of
each cohort are affected by the same conditions.
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Because of the internal and external validity protec-
tion, each ship is not only an experimental group, but also
serves as its own control.
F. CONTROL VARIABLES
In order to measure the pure effect of the commanding
officer on a ship's reenlistment rate, it is first necessary
to control for the influences that are not under the control
of the commanding officer. Study of the raw reenlistment
rates of a command over an extended time period explains
this point. (See Figures 3.1 and 3.2.)
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 represent the reenlistment rates for
two ships over a seven year period with the periods that the
ships were on a deployment'' superimposed (darkened portion
of curve). A loose correlation of reenlistment rates with
the deployment cycle is observed. In order to filter out
the cyclical nature of the apparent deployment influence
from the reenlistment rates, a ship's deployment schedule
must be treated as a factor.
Control for other influences on an individual basis is
also required due to the wide range of influences on indi-
vidual reenlistment behavior. For example, personnel with
dependents are affected by pay variables in a manner
different from that of bachelors
.
This control problem was addressed by reviewing the
variables studied by previous researchers and categorizing
them as either individual, environmental, or organizational.
(See Figure 3.3.)
Deployments consist of approximately six month periods
when the ship is out of homeport and assigned to a fleet in
an overseas area. Pacific coast ships deploy to the Western
Pacific and Indian Ocean.
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Figure 3.1 Raw Reenlistment Example 1
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Individual variables were bio-demographical in nature and
represented those characteristics of the individual beyond
the control of the Navy. 5 Environmental variables
5 In addition to the researchers noted earlier who
utilized bio-demographic variables, Bluedorn also wrote that
until the variance in voluntary staying or leaving can be
totally explained by more analytical variables, demographic
characteristics must be used to predict behavior.
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represented those influences on the individual that were
beyond the control of both the individual and the individu-
al's command, such as, the ship's underway schedule and
national economic conditions.
The final category, organizational variables, comprised
those influences inherent in the individual ship commands
such as leadership, supervisory policies, and command
administration.
Once a set of variables was nominated, the next step was
to construct a data set from available files and archives.
As the search for a data base began, a choice had to be made
between longitudinal and cross- sectional data. It was
decided that the best approach would be to use the "snap-
shot" technique and obtain cross- sect ional data on individ-
uals as they faced their reenlistment decision. This
approach was justified by research of Porter [Ref . 9] that
had found that the most critical period for the turnover
decision was just prior to the actual decision. It is also
intuitive that an individual's employment decisions are
based primarily upon the facts and circumstances at hand,
regardless of discount rates.
A search for a data base resulted in obtaining from the
Defense Manpower Data Center the "Loss File." This file
contains several fields of information on individuals who
are "lost" to the Navy as a result of terminating active
duty prior to or at the end of their obligated service.
Those personnel who immediately reenlist are assigned a
special code of "000" in order to distinguish their records
from those who left the Navy.
The environmental variables were supplied from the
archives of Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific located in
San Diego, California.
The organizational variables, the most intangible of the
three groups, are considered in the methodology as
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hypothetical constructs. The factors represented by these
variables would account for the the major portion of the
variance in the model, according to hypotheses stated
earlier, and are strongly influenced by the commanding
officer. The lack of measureable variables which reflect
these constructs was paramount to the decision to use this
particular methodology.
The primary concern was that the first two groups of
variables would provide enough significant variables that
probabilities of reenlistment by cohort group could be
generated
.
G. PERIOD OF STUDY
The period over which the data base was developed is
also significant. During the late 1970's, the Navy, as well
as the other Military Services , experienced declines in
recruiting and reenlistment. The trend was reversed in the
early 1980' s. Data analysis over this famine-feast cycle
might be of benefit to the Navy in order to combat future
deteriorating conditions.
H. SHIP TYPE
After careful consideration of the variables in Figure
3.3, it was decided to limit the sample population to the 17
fast frigates currently homeported in San Diego, California.
There were several reasons for this decision.
1. Choosing ships of the same type would control for
ship type which could range from aircraft carriers
with a 7,000 member crew to a hydrofoil craft with a
crew of 21. Habitability conditions and other
factors differ proportionally across ship type.
2. Choosing ships from the same homeport controlled for
the variety of homeports available. Currently U.S.
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Naval vessels are homeported in several Atlantic and
Pacific coast ports of the U.S., as well as some
overseas locations. Some locations are considered
more favorable than others.
3. The fast frigate, 438 feet long with a crew of 17
officers and 228 enlisted men [Ref. 40], is a repre-
sentative destroyer/ cruiser type warship with
moderate habitability conditions.
4. All 17 of the San Diego based fast frigates were in
active service for the period FY77 through FY83; the
only years that personnel data were available.
I. PROBABILITY FUNCTION AND COHORT
To establish the probability that an individual would
reenlist , the logistic function was used with its range of
values from to 1.0 [Ref. 41]. The SAS LOGIST procedure is
tailored to this purpose and provides individual probabili-
ties based on analysis of an entire population. 6
Prior to the computation of individual probabilities, a
cohort consisting of each individual who faced the reenlist-
ment decision during each fiscal year (1977-1983) was estab-
lished. This cohort selection allowed for the control of
environmental economic factors which existed at the the time
of decision.
J. DELTAS
Once individual probabilities of reenlistment were
established, each was then compared t'o the actual reenlist-
ment decision (value of 1 if the person reenlisted, if he
did not), and a delta was generated. (O-Probability
produced a negative delta and 1-Probability produced a
6 The LOGIST procedure fits the logistic multiple regres
sion model to a single binary (0-1) dependent variable.
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positive delta.) Large positive deltas indicate that a
commanding officer had reenlisted a person who was unlikely
to reenlist based on cohort data; and, conversely, large
negative deltas indicate that a commanding officer did not
reenlist a likely candidate. Deltas near 0.0 represent the
fleet norm.
The means of these individual deltas were then computed
for each ship for each fiscal quarter and plotted on a time
line. Commanding officer tenures were . then mapped upon the
time lines. .
K. ANTICIPATED TRENDS
Based upon the organizational theory developed and the
emphasis placed upon the commanding officer's influence on
the EOE and retention, the resulting plots were expected to
show a gradual increase or decrease in the means of the
deltas as a commanding officer's tour progressed. Such a
trend would approximate the gradual impact of a commanding
officer on the EOE and the eventual change in reenlistment
rates. Commanding officers who had a positive impact on EOE
would precipitate increases in the means of deltas and,
conversely, commanding officers who had a negative impact
would engender decreasing means.
L. REENLISTMENT PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS
After quarterly deltas were generated, they were
compared with the difference between unit and fleet (all San
Diego FF ' s ) reenlistment averages. If the sign of the delta
matched the sign of the unit percentage less the fleet
percentage, the quarterly percentage was considered valid.
If the signs were opposite, the percentage was declared
invalid. Frequencies of invalid percentages were then
generated for each unit.
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M. ASSUMPTIONS
The primary assumption made during the data analysis was
that the subjects who were entered into the data base were
on the ships that were studied for on year prior to their
reenlistment decision. Basis for this assumption is Navy
assignment policy which requires that, unless extreme opera-
tional requirements exist, an individual will not be ordered
to execute a permanent change of station (PCS) less than one
year before Expiration of Active Obligated Service (EAOS).
It is acknowledged that these circumstances do exist and
some people might report to a new ship just prior to EAOS,
however, for the purpose of this data base, those numbers
would be insignificant.
It was also assumed that sailors designated "not
eligible" for reenlistment were legitimately not eligible
for reenlistment. 7 That is, the commanding officer of that
vessel did not designate borderline (professional perform-
ance) sailors as "not eligible" in order to avoid having a
non- reenlisting "eligible" counting against his command's
retention statistics.
A third assumption was that the civilian/military pay
ratio as well as unemployment conditions amongst civilians
remained fairly constant throughout each particular fiscal
year
.
7 Reenlistment eligibility includes several criteria
primary of which is that a sailor has shown sustained excel-





The methodology outlined provided only a starting point
for data analysis. Characteristic of any new research
attempt, the animation of the theory requires periodic
adjustments to the preliminary paradigm. This chapter
outlines the actual data analysis as it progressed.
A. DATA BASE
The data base was constructed from data located at
several sources. (See Appendix A.) The variables which
ultimately made up the data base are listed in Table 2.
Table 2 defines each variable and gives its source. The
variables are of two basic types: 1) raw variables, those
which come directly from records, and 2) constructed vari-
ables, those which are synthesized from raw values.
The ultimate goal of the data base preparation was to be
able to segregate the records of sailors who were eligible
to reenlist by fiscal quarter (quarter in which the sailor
reenlisted or separated) and by UIC (the ship that the
sailor was on at time of reenlistment or separation)
.
B. DATA ANALYSIS
At the beginning of the data processing, calculated
reenlistment percentages were compared with percentages
provided by Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,
Personnel and Training) with favorable results. This





































Total Active Military Service (months) DMDC
DOD Primary Occupation Code DMDC
Highest Year of Education Completed DMDC
Armed Forces Qual . Test Percentile DMDC
Paygrade DMDC
Date of Birth (Year) DMDC
Date of Birth (Month) DMDC
Date of Birth (Day) DMDC
Race DMDC
Marital Status DMDC
Number of Dependents DMDC
AFQT Mental Category DMDC
Rating DMDC
Naval Enlisted Code DMDC
Separation Code DMDC
Date of Separation (Year) DMDC
Date of Separation (Month) DMDC
Date of Separation (Day) DMDC
Basic Active Service Date (Year) DMDC
Basic Active Service Date (Month) DMDC
Basic Active Service Date (Day) DMDC
Date of Current Paygrade (Year) DMDC
Date of Current Paygrade (Month) DMDC
Date of Latest Enlistment (Year) DMDC
Date of Latest Enlistment (Month) DMDC
Variable Reenlistment Bonus Multiplier DMDC
Reenlistment Eligibility Code DMDC
Pay Entry Base Date (Year) DMDC
Pay Entry Base Date (Month) DMDC
Pay Entry Base Date (Day) DMDC








Data Base Variables (cont'd.)
Hours Steamed by Unit Last Quarter
Months Unit Deployed During Quarter
Number of OPPE ' s Held Last Quarter
Months in Overhaul Last Quarter


















Age of Subject at Reenlistment Date (Months)
Quality Variable: PAYGRADE/Length of Service
Time Since Last Promotion (Months)
Fiscal Quarter in Which Reenlistment
Decision Made
Career Period
Term=l Less than 72 months service
Term=2 Greater than 72 months,
less than or equal to 120 months
Term=3 Greater than 120 months.
less than or equal to 168 months
Term=4 Greater than lb8 months
Operational Propulsion Plant
Examinations (OPPE)
During Previous Six Months
Sum or Shipyard Time over previous 6 months
Sum of STMHRS Over Previous 12 Months
Sum of Deployment Time Over Previous 6 Months
MARSTAT multiplied by AWAY









Independent variables to represent
underway time and family separation
Time ship spends in an industrial
environment
.




Data Base Variables (cont'd.)
QUAL Control for quality:
(Paygrade/Years of service)
AGE Age (months) of subject.
CRISIS OPPE's; Stressful period for crew.
1 . Model Building
After the data base was validated, model building
began with the stepwise procedure. The criteria that was
used to compare the relative fits of the models were:
1. chi-square,
2. the estimated probability of concordance between
predicted probabilities and responses, and
3. the difference in concordance and discordance
probabilities
.
Variables were fed into the model by fiscal year in
accordance with the cohort concept discussed previously.
The stepwise procedure determined significance of each vari-
able added to the model. The p<.05 level was the cutoff for
significance
.
After each model was tested, new variables were
constructed from combinations of raw variables to attempt to
force more variables into the models. In addition, vari-
ables which were based on summations over a period were
adjusted to lengthen or shorten the period. For example,
the AWAY variable, whose value was the number of months the
subject was recently deployed, was adjusted from the last
quarter up to a summation of the last year. The final
period which showed best results was a two quarter period




In addition to variable construction, several data
partitions were attempted to improve model fit. "By
TERM" (reenlistment term) and "by rating" were the most
likely. Also, "by Selected Reenlistment Bonus(SRB)" was
attempted. All these met with no success. However, a new
variable, MARKET, was constructed to differentiate among
ratings by SRB, and did show potential. With MARKET, each
rating was placed in one of three market categories based
upon amount of bonus offered to remain in the Navy. This
was an attempt to control for those ratings which had the
most attractive skills for civilian employers. After a
MARKET value was generated for each of the ratings, models
were then attempted for each of the three MARKET groups.
C. BEST MODELS
After all partitioning was completed, it was found that
none of the partitioned data bases improved on the original
data base composed of all career groups and all ratings.
The final logistic models were selected for each fiscal year
(FY77-FY83) cohort and then entered into the LOGIST proce-
dure. Individual probabilities of reenlistment for each
sailor were then generated.
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V. RESULTS
Logistic functions were estimated from cohort sections
of the 4245 record data base. The variables in Table 4 were
selected as the significant variables for each cohort model.
All models were significant at the p<.001 level. A tabula-
tion of the significant variables from all the models is
provided in .Table 3. In the table, each variable is listed
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When the delta values associated with a given ship were
plotted as a function of time, the plots contained in
Appendix B resulted. The patterns that occurred during each
tenure were categorized by the predominant behavior of the
deltas during each tenure. The 62 tenures were placed in
the following categories:
1. Deltas remain predominantly in the positive region
during the tenure (delta greater than 0.0). (See
Figure 5 . 1.
)
8
2. Deltas remain predominantly in the negative region
during the tenure (delta less than 0.0). (See Figure
5.2. )
3. Deltas with definite slopes. Shift from positive to
negative and vice versa or initial deltas clearly
positive or negative, and shift to a more neutral
position (closer to or around the 0.0 baseline).
(See Figures 5.3 and 5.4.)
4. Deltas that are unsystematic about the 0.0 baseline.
(See Figure 5.5.)
Table 5 tabulates the numbers of patterns that emerged.
B. DELTA/REENLISTMENT PERCENTAGE COMPARISON
After the deltas were compared to reenlistment rates of
eligibles, 85 percent of the quarterly reenlistment rates
were determined valid. Gross reenlistment rates (eligible
and non-eligible personnel) were determined to be valid 82
percent of the time.
8 In all the delta plots, the vertical interruptions of
the time lines indicate the beginning of the first quarter
in which the new commanding officer is completely respon-
sible for retention although he may have actually taken over
from his predecessor sometime during the previous quarter.
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CONTENTS OF OUTPUT DATA SET 27
UIC=N54058
PLOT OF DELTA*QTR SYMBOL IS VALUE OF NR
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Figure 5.1 Positive Delta Example
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CONTENTS OF OUTPUT DATA SET 20
16:22 FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1984
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Figure 5.2 Negative Delta Example
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Figure 5.4 Negative Slope Example
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Figure 5.5 Unsystematic Delta Example
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TABLE 5










The delta plots indicate distinct trends which are not
as discernable when graphs of raw reenlistment rates
(sailors eligible for reenlistment) are studied. (See
Appendix C.) The well-defined trends within the delta plots
are achieved by the application of the logistic function
which acted as a smoothing function on the raw data.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide a comparison.
A large proportion (42 percent) of the delta plots
bracket the 0.0 baseline indicating that the ship is
retaining in accordance with the fleet norm. This propor-
tion of unsystematic patterns is no surprise in light of the
competition to become a commanding officer. Each Naval
Officer who aspires to command at sea must complete several
levels of professional and tactical skills qualifications,
as well as, performance record screenings by the time they
attain Commander rank (a time frame of approximately 14
years). Of this final qualified group, less than one half
are selected to become commanding officers. Such a competi-
tive process assures the Navy of a uniformly high level of
professional competence among its skippers.
Although only 13 of the 62 commanding officer tenures
showed definite slopes, every pattern offers an opportunity
for insights into skipper performance. In addition to the
unsystematic plots:
1. A consistently positive delta indicates that the
commanding officer is retaining above the fleet norm,
i.e., he is retaining some sailors who might have
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Figure 6.2 Comparison Example
Single Ship Delta Plot.
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2. A consistently negative delta plot indicates that the
commanding officer is retaining below the fleet
average, i.e., not retaining some sailors who would
have reenlisted under other personal conditions or
command environments.
3. A shift from negative to positive indicates an
improving command environment. These effects would
result if, upon inheriting a command which had been
experiencing difficulties in leadership, a new
commanding officer turns the situation around by
improving the command climate.
4. A shift from positive to negative indicates a deteri-
orating command environment. In this case, a new
commanding officer might take over a thriving
command, only to cause deterioration in the command
climate and a subsequent reduction in retention.
(These reversal trends are, perhaps, the most signif-
icant because they imply the new commanding officer




5. A shift from above average (or below average) command
climate to the baseline represents retention rates
which regress (or progress) toward the fleet norm.
B. SHIFT LAG
Support for the theory that these delta shifts are
caused by changes in commanding officers is given by the
relative frequency with which the trend shifts are preceded
by a commanding officer change. These shifts normally lag
the change in commanding officer by one to two quarters.
This observed lag supports the commanding officer-EOE link
because of the time period required for the commanding offi-
cer's policies and leadership to impact the organizational
65
environment, as well as the time required for individuals to
perceive a change of environment. In addition, a negative
trend normally displayed a greater slope than a positive
trend. This suggests that it takes longer to turn a poor
organizational environment around than it does to permit a
good environment to deteriorate.
C. TREND ABSENCE
Perhaps even more significant than the trends so far
discussed, is the absence of one particular trend. These
would be plots displaying positive deltas during the bulk of
a commanding officer's tenure, but negative or less positive
near the end of his tour, indicating that the commanding
officer is becoming less effective as a retainer towards the
end of his tour. This phenomenon runs counter to popular
conceptions of normative management behavior. Had there
been even a small number of trends of this form it would
suggest that all observed trends might be no more than
random effects, not necessarily associated with commanding
officer changes
.
The opposite effect is also possible. One can find
instances among the delta plots of negative results at the
beginning of a tour and either positive or more neutral
results at the end. Such effects may describe commanding
officers who start their tour as poor retainers , but improve
throughout their tenure.
D. DELTA PLOT RESTRICTIONS
Additional analysis of the delta plots is somewhat
restricted. It may seem desireable to calculate slopes of
the plots, then equate them to successful and unsuccessful
retainers, but this would result in misleading conclusions
in those instances in which a good retainer steps into an
66
already positive situation. His success would result in a
zero slope as the deltas remained positive.
Along the same line of reasoning, averages of deltas
would not accurately reflect command climates. A commanding
officer may take over a negative situation and lead it to
the baseline. In this instance, although a good retainer
who is demonstrating improvement from an initial low point,
this commanding officer's overall average delta would be




An argument could be made that more is being read into
the delta plots than is actually there. It is often said
that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," and it is
always dangerous to base firm conclusions upon subjectively
validated hypotheses. However, considering the 17 delta
plots in total, the trends appear to be more than coinci-
dental; and, as stated at the outset, an attempt was made in
this study to depart from standard methods of analysis. A
paradigm has been provided for follow-on researchers.
One alternative explanation for the trends that did
materialize is that the commanding officer's impact alone
did not precipitate the change. Other organization-wide
influences may operate; viz. a new Executive Officer, new
Command Master Chief, or new Command Career Counselor.
Thus, management personnel throughout the chain of command
combine to bring about changes in the organizational
environment
.
In addition, other forces may have been at work. Ships
are sometimes plagued by chronic engineering problems which
can result in prolonged periods of poor crew morale. This
situation would foster a deteriorating organizational
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environment with subsequent low reenlistment rates. Effects
of such circumstances could linger from one commanding
officer tenure to the next. These situations are largely
irreparable no matter who takes command. All these argu-
ments lead to the question, Can one person alone really make
a difference? This is a question which will remain momen-
tarily unanswered.
F. IMPLICATIONS
This thesis supports the claim that the commanding
officer is a significant factor in reenlistment decisions.
Although the direct influence of a given commanding officer
on a given individual's decision cannot be demonstrated,
aggregate results do suggest that the commanding officer is
an important factor within each command. As seen in the
delta plots, a commanding officer may precipitate a shift of
as much as 40 percent reenlistment rate. (See Figure 6.3.)
Based upon an elasticity of one percent pay increase for
each two percent improvement in reenlistment rate, this
.equates to certain commanding officers retention ability
being worth a 20 percent adjustment in enlisted pay.
G. HOW COMMANDING OFFICERS MAKE AN IMPACT
If one accepts that the commanding officer is a signifi-
cant factor, and his impact is delivered through the organi-
zational environment, the question is then raised, What
specifically can a commanding officer do that would impact
the EOE and promote improved retention? The answer is
complex, and deserves scrutiny by follow-on researchers;
however, there are enough visible contrasts in leadership
styles to provide an intial response.
People- oriented commanding officers, such as those
described by Gullickson and Chenette, put a great deal of
68
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personality and charisma into their retention efforts.
Letters to parents and spouses from the command indicating
achievements of the unit or individual promote individual
pride. Recognition ceremonies onboard ship before the
assembled crew, command social events, an efficient reten-
tion program, person to person contact by the commanding
officer, and other command sponsored programs add up to
special touches which promote a healthy command environment.
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the results oriented
skipper who may not be as attuned to personal needs. These
commanding officers may also be successful retainers because
sailors are proud of competitive ships, the ones that seem
to be "out in front." This feeling of pride and recognition
translates into good morale and organizational commitment.
A more in depth answer to this question would be of
significance to the Navy, and judging by the amount of
research already completed concerning organizational envi-
ronment, the answers may already exist.
H. YARDSTICK
Although raw reenlistment percentages (gross or eligible
only) may not be valid 100. percent of the time, their ease
of calculation makes them the best available approximation
of command retention capability. A comparison of unit
percentage with the average of the same class units in the
same homeport may be used to judge the retention capability
of a command, as weil as provide a barometer by which the
commanding officer and unit commanders can gauge a unit '
s
organizational environment. Retention is only a symptom,
not the problem. Continued low retention compared to the





Marty Binkin [Ref. 42] pointed out in his 1984 book on
the All-Volunteer Force:
1. with the nation's economy improving,
2. employers looking for people with increased technical
skills, and
3. demographics declining (fewer accession age males),
the AVF is in for hard times. These factors, coupled with
the Navy's surge to a 600 ship fleet, makes the challenge of
staying manned with the highest quality personnel a diffi-
cult one. The Navy must react with a broad spectrum of
initiatives
.
The influence of the commanding officer through the
organizational environment must not be discounted by policy
makers or researchers. To rely solely on the lure of
increased pay as the primary answer to declining reenlist-
ment rates is false security as pointed out by Dr. A.J.
Martin, former Director for Accession Policy, Office of
Secretary of Defense [Ref. 43]. He insisted that our
federal budgetary cycle is too cumbersome to depend on to
provide the quick dosage of money that would prevent the
mass exodus of personnel experienced in the late 1970 's when
a strong civilian economy prevailed. Additionally, reliance
on fiscal remedies runs counter to the current government
austerity measures, and may not be depended upon regardless
of the budgetary lag.
Improvement of the organizational environment, although
a more complex solution, must be developed as an alternative
to fiscal measures. Close attention must be given to the
volumes of research that has been completed addressing the
factors that form a person's perception of military life.
These factors need to be presented in detail for all levels
of management to study and address.
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Can one person make a difference? Researchers think so.
Thornton, et al [Ref. 44], in studying the critical leader-
ship incidents in the Navy concluded, "Leaders can influence
the outcomes of problem situations they face. The use of
certain modes of interpersonal influence have a direct
bearing on the outcome." In other words, commanding offi-




Retention training for commanding officers and executive
officers is minimal at present. Occasional "helpful hints"
and success stories are the extent. No detailed study of
problem sources and possible solutions are available to
these "local" managers. At present, the bulk of training is
devoted to Command Career Counselors. However, a retention
oriented organization requires expertise and ability at all
levels. A career counselor is impotent in the face of a
commanding officer who is ignorant in regard to good reten-
tion practices
.
Finally, commanding officers, especially those that are
mission oriented, must gain an appreciation for the idea
that a skipper who is people oriented is of great value to
the Navy. A good retaining skipper is ensuring that the
Navy can not only do the job today, but also will be able to
do the job in the future because he is retaining the people
who have the requisite experience and training. Retention
means long range readiness.
K. RECOMMENDATIONS
As stated at the outset, this research is an attempt at
ground breaking for a new method with a different perspec-
tive. The primary goal is to provide a stepping stone for
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follow-on researchers. The next step in validation of the
methodology developed here would be to compare the delta
trends for each commanding officer with the Enlisted Exit
Questionnaire data to see how the questionnaire results
correlated with the best and worst retainers. Is there a
discernable outlook difference among sailors leaving a posi-
tive retaining command versus those leaving a negative
retaining command? Lack of significant fleet feedback in
the form of questionnaire submission prevented this correla-
tion from taking place in this thesis.
A new questionnaire, the 1982 Enlisted Retention
Questionnaire has the potential to be a rich source of data
which could be correlated with the delta trends. Instead of
examining how poor retaining commanding officers affect
leavers, this questionnaire will provide some insight into
the effects of good retaining skippers on those personnel
that reenlist.
One possible follow-up would be a detailed look at those
commanding officers who were considered to have a positive
impact on reenlistment . Close analysis of their methods and
leadership would help to pinpoint their influence on the
organizational environment. In addition, a longitudinal
study of commanding officers who retained well during their
first command tour in comparison to subsequent command tours
would also improve the knowledge base.
The Navy must pursue the skipper factor to the fullest.
To leave it and other organizational environment factors
unattended would be to deny seeking an efficient and cost-




The sources of data for the data base were as follows;
1. Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.
Provided personnel biographic, demographic, and
service history related information.
2. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Provided
names and tenure of commanding officers.
3. Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, Coronado,
California. Provided underway schedule files from
which underway dates and Operational Propulsion Plant
Examination (OPPE) dates were determined.
4. Navy Personnel Reaearch and Development Center, San
Diego, California. Provided Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire results.
5. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel
and Training) , Officer and Enlisted Retention
Programs Section (OP136D) . Provided reenlistment
figures and Selected Reenlistment Bonus data.
6. Navy Ships Parts Cntrol Center, Navy Maintenance
Support Office Department, Mechanicsburg
,
Pennsylvania. Provided Steaming, Operating, and Fuel





The enclosed plots indicate the mean delta for each of
the 17 San Diego based fast frigates for each fiscal year
quarter during the period October 1976- September 1983. Data
for the two quarters beginning January 1979 (7901) and
January 1980 (8001) were not available.
Note: The N's for each ship for each quarter are indicated
on the plots by the letter used for the plotting symbol. An
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SHIP REENLISTMENT RATES (ELIGIBLE)
The enclosed plots indicate the reenlistment rate
(eligible only) attained by each of the 17 San Diego based
fast frigates for each fiscal year quarter during the period
October 1976-September 1983. Data for the two quarters
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The enclosed SAS programs were utilized to perform the
data set construction and delta analysis which provided the
plots contained in Appendices B and C.
Ill
v*" v*Program to input personnel data***












































DATE = DOSYR-100 + DOSMO;
SRBDATE=DOSYR*10000+DOSMO*100+DOSDY;
AGE = ((DOSYR-DOBYR) * 12) + (DOSMO-DOBMO )
;





IF( UIC EQ 'N54045' )OR(UIC EQ 'N54046')
OR(UIC EQ 'N54048' )OR(UIC EQ 'N54050'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54053' )OR(UIC EQ 'N54058'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54060' )OR(UIC EQ 'N54061'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54064' )OR(UIC EQ 'N54065'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54071' )OR(UIC EQ 'N20054'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54038' )OR(UIC EQ 'N54049'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54055' )OR(UIC EQ 'N20066'
OR(UIC EQ 'N54035') THEN SHIP = 1;
ELSE SHIP = 0;
IF DATE LT 7810 THEN FLAG1= 1; ELSE FLAG1= 0;
IF(FLAG1 EQ 1 AND REB EQ 1)
OR (FLAG1 EQ 1 AND REB EQ 101)
OR (FLAG1 EQ AND REB1 EQ '1 ')
OR (FLAG1 EQ AND REB1 EQ '1R')
THEN REC = 1;
ELSE REC = 2;
DROP FLAG1;
IF SEPCODE EQ 'KHC' OR SEPCODE EQ '000'
THEN REEN = 1;
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ELSE REEN=0;
IF DATE GT 7609 AND DATE LT 7701 THEN QTR = 7610
IF DATE GT 7 612 AND DATE LT 7 704 THEN QTR = 7 701
IF DATE GT 7703 AND DATE LT 7707 THEN QTR = 7704
IF DATE GT 7706 AND DATE LT 7710 THEN QTR = 7707
IF DATE GT 7709 AND DATE LT 7801 THEN QTR = 7710
IF DATE GT 7 712 AND DATE LT 7804 THEN QTR = 7801
IF DATE GT 7803 AND DATE LT 7807 THEN QTR = 7804
IF DATE GT 7806 AND DATE LT 7810 THEN QTR = 7807
IF DATE GT 7809 AND DATE LT 7901 THEN QTR = 7810
IF DATE GT 7 912 AND DATE LT 7 904 THEN QTR = 7 901
IF DATE GT 7903 AND DATE LT 7907 THEN QTR = 7904
IF DATE GT 7906 AND DATE LT 7910 THEN QTR = 7907
IF DATE GT 7909 AND DATE LT 8001 THEN QTR = 7910
IF DATE GT 8012 AND DATE LT 8004 THEN QTR = 8001
IF DATE GT 8003 AND DATE LT 8007 THEN QTR = 8004
IF DATE GT 8006 AND DATE LT 8010 THEN QTR = 8007
IF DATE GT 8009 AND DATE LT 8101 THEN QTR = 8010
IF DATE GT 8012 AND DATE LT 8104 THEN QTR = 8101
IF DATE GT 8103 AND DATE LT 8107 THEN QTR = 8104
IF DATE GT 8106 AND DATE LT 8110 THEN QTR = 8107
IF DATE GT 8109 AND DATE LT 8201 THEN QTR = 8110
IF DATE GT 8112 AND DATE LT 8204 THEN QTR = 8201
IF DATE GT 8203 AND DATE LT 8207 THEN QTR = 8204
IF DATE GT 8206 AND DATE LT 8210 THEN QTR = 8207
IF DATE GT 8209 AND DATE LT 8301 THEN QTR = 8210
IF DATE GT 8212 AND DATE LT 8 3 04 THEN QTR = 8 301
IF DATE GT 8303 AND DATE LT 8307 THEN QTR = 8304
IF DATE GT 8 306 AND DATE LT 8 310 THEN QTR = 8 307
IF QTR LT 8310 AND QTR GT 8207 THEN FY= 83
IF QTR LT 8210 AND QTR GT 8107 THEN FY= 82
IF QTR LT 8110 AND QTR GT 8007 THEN FY= 81
IF QTR LT 8010 AND QTR GT 7907 THEN FY= 80
IF QTR LT 7910 AND QTR GT 7807 THEN FY= 79
IF QTR LT 7810 AND QTR GT 7707 THEN FY= 78
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IF QTR LT 7710 AND QTR GT 7607 THEN FY= 77;
IF ACDU LE 72 THEN TERM= 1
;
IF ACDU GT 72 AND ACDU LE 120 THEN TERM=2;
IF ACDU GT 120 AND ACDU LE 168 THEN TERM=3;
IF ACDU GT 168 THEN TERM=4;
//
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""-Program to input ship data--"






//MYFILE DD DISP= (OLD , KEEP) ,DSN=MSS . S1850 .USNREC
//SYS IN DD *
OPTIONS LINESIZE=80;
DATA SHIP;
INPUT UIC $ CO COUNT QTR STMHRS DEPLOY OVHL OVHLOHP OPPE;
CARDS
;
N54035 3703 0101 7510 318
N54035 3703 0102 7601 52
N54035 3703 0103 7604 10
N54035 3703 0104 7607 3
N54035 3703 0105 7610 3
N54035 3704 0106 7701 92 1
N54035 3704 0107 7704 776
N54035 3704 0108 7707 722
N54035 3704 0109 7710 618
N54035 3704 0110 7801 396
N54035 3704 0111 7804 1718 3
N54035 3704 0112 7807 772 3
N54035 3704 0113 7810 708 1
N54035 3705 0114 7901 187
N54035 3705 0115 7904 431
N54035 3705 0116 7907 1403
N54035 3705 0117 7910 868 2
N54035 3705 0118 8001 981 3
N54035 3705 0119 8004 593 2
N54035 3705 0120 8007 10
N54035 3705 0121 8010 3
N54035 3706 0122 8101 3
N54035 3706 0123 8104 3
116
N54035 3706 0124 8107 59 3
N54035 3706 0125 8110 381
N54035 3706 0126 8201 382
N54035 3706 0127 8204 912 1
N54035 3706 0128 8207 754 3
N54035 3706 0129 8210 1032 2
N54035 3706 0130 8301 93
N54035 3707 0131 8304 341
N54035 3707 0132 8307 784







""-Program to compute reenlistment rates of FF's***









IF SHIP EQ 1 AND (DATE GT 7609) AND (DATE LT 8310)
AND REC EQ 1;




OUTPUT OUT = USNSUB2
N(REEN) = NCASE
SUM (REEN) = NREEN;
DATA USNSUB2;
SET USNSUB2;
IF QTR EQ . THEN DELETE;
PREEN = NREEN/NCASE;
PROC PLOT UNIFORM;
PLOT PREEN -QTR= '*' /HAXIS=7 610
7701 7704 7707 7710 7801 7804
7807 7810 7901 7904 7907 7910
8001 8004 8007 8010 8101 8104





"'"""-''Program to compute deltas*"'-'
//USNREC JOB (1850,5555) , ' HEWETT
'
, CLASSIC




//MYFILE DD DISP=SHR,DSN=MSS . S1850 .USNREC




TOTHRS = LAGl(STMHRS) + LAG2 ( STMHRS
)
+ LAG3( STMHRS) + LAG4 ( STMHRS )
;
AWAY=LAG1 (DEPLOY )+LAG2 (DEPLOY)
;






IF QTR GT 7607;
DATA TEMP2;
SET MYFILE. USNREC;
IF SHIP EQ 1 AND (DATE GT 7609)
AND (DATE LT 8310) AND REC EQ 1;
IF RACE EQ 1 THEN WHITE=1; ELSE WHITE=0;
PROC SORT DATA = TEMPSHIP; BY UIC QTR;










IF FY EQ 77;
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PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA77
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED77;
MODEL REEN^ACDU WHITE DEP/PRINTI PRINTQ;




IF FY EQ 78;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA78
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED78;





IF FY EQ 79;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA79
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED79;






IF FY EQ 80;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA80
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED80;






IF FY EQ 81;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA81
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OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED81;





IF FY EQ 82;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA82
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED82;





IF FY EQ 83;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA83
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED83;
MODEL REEN= PAYGRADE DEP AGE AFQTPER AWAY/
PRINTI PRINTQ;
PROC SORT DATA=PRED8 3;
BY UIC QTR;
DATA BETAS;
MERGE BETA77 BETA78 BETA79
BETA80 BETA81 BETA82 BETA83;
DATA PRED;
MERGE PRED77 PRED78 PRED79
PRED80 PRED81 PRED82 PRED83;
BY UIC QTR;
PROC PRINT DATA=BETAS;











OUTPUT OUT= SKIPPER MEAN =DELTA N = N;
PROC PLOT UNIFORM;
BY UIC;
PLOT DELTA*QTR=N/HAXIS=7 610 7 701 7 7 04
7707 7710 7801 7804 7807
7810 7901 7904 7907 7910 8001
8004 8007 8010 8101 8104 8107 8110





reenlistment percentages with deltas-""'
//USNREC JOB (1850,5555) , 'HEWETT' , CLASSIC
/
/









IF SHIP EQ 1 AND (DATE GT 7609)
AND (DATE LT 8 310)
;




OUTPUT OUT = USNSUB2
N(REEN) = NCASE
SUM (REEN) = NREEN;
DATA USNSUB2;
SET USNSUB2;
IF UIC EQ ' ' THEN DELETE;





OUTPUT OUT = USNSUB3
N(REEN) = NCASE
SUM (REEN) = NREEN;
DATA USNSUB3;
SET USNSUB3;





PROC SORT DATA=USNSUB2; BY QTR
;










TOTHRS = LAGl(STMHRS) + LAG2(STMHRS)
+ LAG3(STMHRS) + LAG4 ( STMHRS )
;
AWAY^LAGl (DEPLOY) +LAG2 (DEPLOY)
;





IF QTR GT 7607;
DATA TEMP2;
SET MYFILE.USNREC;
IF SHIP EQ 1 AND (DATE GT 7609)
AND (DATE LT 8 310) AND REC EQ 1;
IF RACE EQ 1 THEN WHITE=1; ELSE WHITE^O;
PROC SORT DATA = TEMPSHIP; BY UIC QTR;










IF FY EQ 77;
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PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA77
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED77;





IF FY EQ 78;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA78
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED78;
MODEL REENGAGE DEP CRISIS YARD WHITE/PRINTI PRINTQ




IF FY EQ 79;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA79
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED79;






IF FY EQ 80;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA80
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED80;






IF FY EQ 81;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA81
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OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED81;





IF FY EQ 82;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA82
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED82;
MODEL REENGAGE DEP WHITE PAYGRADE ED/PRINTI PRINTQ;




IF FY EQ 83;
PROC LOGIST PRINTC OUTPUT OUT=BETA83
OUTPUTP OUTP=PRED83;







MERGE BETA77 BETA78 BETA79
BETA80 BETA81 BETA8 2 BETA83;
DATA PRED;
MERGE PRED77 PRED78 PRED79
PRED80 PRED81 PRED82 PRED8 3;
BY UIC QTR;
PROC PRINT DATA=BETAS;











OUTPUT OUT= SKIPPER MEAN =DELTA N = N;
PROC SORT DATA= SKIPPER;
BY UIC QTR;





IF DELTPCT GE AND DELTA GE THEN SWITCH=0;
ELSE IF DELTPCT LT AND DELTA LT THEN SWITCH=0;
ELSE SWITCH=1;
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